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Abstract
This article investigates how the results of the electoral polls and the registration of
electronic bets on the outcome of the 2016 Presidential election of the United States
explain the stock market performance and the currency exchange rates for Canada and
Mexico, the other two member countries of NAFTA. Although the Canadian and Me-
xican economies are not so different in size—both compared to the U.S.—, the financial
variables of the first were not reactive to the news of the electoral process, whereas
those of the latter were significantly affected. Opinion survey data and prediction mar-
ket prices were obtained for November 2014 to November 2016 from FiveThirtyEight
and Iowa Electronic Markets, respectively. The VAR and VECM models proved that
the information of the prediction markets is incorporated faster than the information
of the surveys, and that the Mexican stock exchange and the MXN-USD exchange rate
were highly sensitive to campaign news. On the other hand, Canadian markets were
not significantly affected. These findings are theoretically relevant from the perspec-
tive of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which are useful to forecast market behavior
during electoral periods in the United States; and is of importance for portfolio ma-
nagers, regulators, and other decision makers.
JEL Classification: C32, D72, D84, E44, F31, G14.
Keywords: USA Presidential campaign; opinion surveys; prediction markets; NAFTA.
Encuestas, Predicción de mercados y variables financieras
Resumen
Este artículo investiga cómo los resultados de las encuestas electorales y el registro
de las apuestas electrónicas sobre la elección presidencial en Estados Unidos del 2016
explican el desempeño de los mercados de capitales y los tipos de cambio de Canadá
y México, los otros dos países socios del TLCAN. Aunque las economías canadienses
y mexicanas no son muy diferentes en tamaño (comparadas con la americana), las
variables financieras canadienses no reaccionaron a las noticias del proceso electoral,
mientras que las mexicanas sí se vieron significativamente afectadas. Los datos de las
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encuestas de opinión y precios de los mercados de predicciones se obtuvieron de noviem-
bre de 2014 a noviembre de 2016, de FiveThirtyEight y de Iowa Electronic Markets,
respectivamente. Los modelos VAR y VECM probaron que la información de los mer-
cados de predicciones es incorporada más rápido que la información de las encuestas,
y que la Bolsa Mexicana y el tipo de cambio Peso/Dólar fueron altamente sensibles
a las noticias de la campaña; pero los mercados canadienses no fueron significativa-
mente afectados. Estos resultados son teóricamente relevantes desde la perspectiva de
la Hipótesis de los Mercados Eficientes; útiles para el pronóstico del comportamiento
de los mercados durante periodos de elecciones en Estados Unidos; y de importancia
para los administradores de portafolios, entidades reguladoras y otros tomadores de
decisiones.
Classification JEL: C32, D72, D84, E44, F31, G14.
Palabras claves: campaña presidencial americana, encuestas de opinión, mercados de
predicciones, TLCAN.
1. Introduction
After the Second World War, the United States achieved the status of the num-
ber one economy in the world. For that reason, whatever major domestic eco-
nomic or political events occur in that country, they have a significant impact
beyond its borders. In the case of Canada and Mexico, its Northern and Southern
neighbors, that impact is particularly noticeable due to the close commercial and
cross-border investment relationships that were boosted by the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the USA since 1994, more than two de-
cades ago. Geographical proximity and a shared border of approximately 3,200
kilometers in the case of Mexico and 8,891 kilometers in the case of Canada,
make geo-politics a very significant component of the daily interactions among
the three NAFTA countries.
Every year Mexican workers in the USA send billions of dollars as remittan-
ces to their families in Mexico4. That income represents a significant component
of the recipient families’ consumption expenditure and small productive invest-
ments. As well, most of Mexico’s goods and services exports are sent to the
USA. For example, in 2016 its exports to the USA totaled $302.6 billion USD,
which represented 81% of total exports (Banxico, 2017). Furthermore, many
Mexican companies have business operations in the USA, enticed by the breath
and depth of that country’s consumer market; and a large number of American
companies operate in Mexico attracted by the low cost and high quality of la-
bor, and the relatively large population of the country5. During the same year,
Canada’s exports to the USA totaled $353.8 billion USD, or 75% of its total
merchandise exports; that means that Canada’s commercial dependence with
respect to the USA is marginally lower than Mexico’s, but still highly significant.
4In 2015, remittances accounted $24.8 million USD, which represent almost 6% of the total
income recorded on the current account of the Mexican balance of payments in that year.
5Approximately, the population of Mexico is 130 million people in 2017, which is close to
four times the population of Canada, of 35 million people.
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6From that perspective, it could have been expected that the news of the cam-
paign trail, in particular those that implied the probability that Trump could
become President of the U.S. was on the rise, given his unfavorable positions
with respect to NAFTA, would affect both other member countries financial
variables in a noticeable way. Nevertheless, during the campaign’s news affected
mostly the Mexican financial markets, and the Canadian markets very scantly.
That fact was the main motivation for this work considering that, even when the
Canadian and the Mexican economies are not so different in absolute size, nor
in terms of the economic importance represented by foreign trade with the U.S.
relative to total GDP, only one of the two experienced significant responses in
the stock market index and the currency exchange rate to the campaign news.
A better understanding of the influence of the campaign trail events, proxied
by electoral polls and bets, on the evolution of the Canadian and the Mexican
financial markets is of much interest for financial economists, policy designers
and investors.
For many decades, scientific polls and prediction markets have been exten-
sively studied and those results have been published in the political science
literature (Hillygus, 2011; Graefe, 2014; Graefe, et al., 2014; Rhode Strumpf,
2004). Most studies that establish a relationship between politics and finan-
cial variables have focused on electoral processes and domestic stock markets
(Jones Banning, 2009; Białkowski, Gottschalk, Wisniewski, 2008; Chien, Ma-
yer, Wang, 2014; Döpke Pierdzioch, 2006; Forsythe, Rietz, Ross, 1999; Hung,
2013). However, to our knowledge, no studies have explored how does an elec-
tion campaign that takes place in one country affect the financial markets of a
third country. This paper uses the prediction markets quotes and the publicly
disseminated scientific polls produced during the 2015-2016 USA Presidential
campaign7, to determine the nature and intensity of their influence on Cana-
da’s and Mexico’s currency exchange rate quotations and stock market indices
performance.
The main hypothesis of this work is that the Mexican stock market and ex-
change rate were more affected by the electoral process news than the Canadian
stock market and exchange rate, revealing a greater vulnerability/dependence
of Mexico’s markets to external events. More specifically, what appeared to be
anecdotal evidence of the Mexican financial variables hypersensitivity to an-
nouncements and reports that the Republican candidate was making progress
among voters is here documented and statistically tested to prove that, by con-
trast with Canadian financial variables, the former were much more reactive.
The data on voters’ preferences used in this analysis was retrieved from two




7The information contained in polls and prediction markets represents a measure of the
subjective probability that polled citizens and bidders attribute to either one of the two main
contenders wins the presidential election.
298 Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
the election (henceforth referred to as the “prediction market results”), and data
from FiveThirtyEight for the USA national polls on the 2015-2016 Presidential
campaign. The Mexican Stock exchange prices are represented by the Mexican
index IPC, the Mexican exchange rate is quoted as Mexican pesos per US do-
llar; the Canadian stock market performance is proxied by the Toronto Stock
Exchange Index (TSX) and the country’s currency exchange rate is expressed
as Canadian dollars per US dollar. All the economic variables were retrieved
from Bloomberg information services databases.
The results obtained from Johansen’s (1988) Cointegration Tests, the Vec-
tor Error Correction Models (VECM) and the Vector Auto Regression Models
(VAR), suggest that prediction markets information contemporaneously affects
both Mexican series (IPC and MXNUSD) while polls information disseminates
at a slower speed and has a lagged effect of one day. In addition, in both cases,
the possibility of the Democratic candidate winning the presidency has a positi-
ve effect in both the IPC and the MXNUSD. Supporting our initial hypothesis,
results also show that Canadian series are not affected by the expected outcome
of the 2015-2016 USA Presidential Election.
While this study is limited to the analysis of only two financial variables
(stock market indices and currency exchange rates), other several issues rela-
ted to the influence of the U.S. electoral process over other countries markets
remain attractive subjects of further study. For instance, the analysis may ex-
tend to measure the impact that the news on the voters’ preferences had on
specific industries, firms, or other financial variables both in Canada and Me-
xico, and beyond NAFTA (e.g. other Latin American countries, E.U. countries,
Russia, etc.). Also, depending on the outcome of the initiatives of Trump on
the revision of NAFTA, the building of the border wall, or on the outcome of
the ongoing probe on Trump campaign’s contact with Russian officials, may
produce interesting objects of study.
The next section refers to some of the most notorious events that took pla-
ce during the 2015-2016 USA Presidential campaign, and briefly discusses so-
me well-accepted theories on the determination of currency exchange rates and
stock market prices. The third section reviews the literature on scientific polls
and prediction markets. The fourth section presents the data, the econometric
methodology applied and the interpretation of the results obtained. The last
section contains some concluding remarks.
2. The 2015-2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign, Generally Accepted
Financial Markets Theories, and How Are They Related
The U.S. 2015-2016 Presidential campaign surprisingly revealed that, beyond
an intensive international trade and investment activity, another powerful link
exists among NAFTA member countries. The noticeable effects that campaign
had on Mexican financial markets (and, to a much lesser extent, on Canadian
financial markets), suggest that the events taking place in the political arena
contaminated financial markets. As the electoral process developed, Donald
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Trump was elected by the Republican Party as Presidential Candidate on May
26th, 2016, and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was elected as the
Democratic candidate one month later, on June 6th, 2016.
Since the beginning of the preliminary campaign to obtain the nomination
of the Republican Party, Trump expressed his concern that millions of foreign
citizens (mostly Mexican nationals) live and work in the USA without pro-
per government authorization, and he pledged to expulse them from the U.S.
territory. He promised to build a thousand of kilometers-long wall, along the
U.S.-Mexico border to stop illegal immigration and drug smuggling. He also
frequently said that he would seriously consider the termination of NAFTA in
case a comprehensive revision could not make it more “fair” to the U.S. During
his campaign speeches, he repeatedly mentioned that NAFTA was the “worst
trade agreement ever negotiated by the USA” and expressed that it could be
blamed for the extensive unemployment observed in several mid-West states of
the U.S. The public speeches in which Trump expressed negative opinions about
Mexico8 consistently had negative effects on that country’s currency exchange
rate and on the performance of its stock market. By contrast, the commentaries
of Clinton, the Democratic contender, were much friendlier and positive towards
Mexico, and had an exactly opposite effect on those two variables. The effects
of both contenders’ speeches on Canadian financial variables were much less
noticeable, and may be considered negligible, as will become evident from the
results of the econometric analysis presented in the following sections of this
paper.
As the electoral process developed, Trump was first elected by the Repu-
blican Party as Presidential Candidate (on May 26th, 2016), and then, former
Clinton was elected as the Democratic candidate (one month later, on June
6th 2016). All throughout the campaign9, the predictive markets had an active
betting activity on its outcome contracts, and many polls were published daily
on the same subject.
Once the Presidential campaign started, more often than not, when Trump’s
campaign made any progress, the Mexican currency depreciated vis à vis the
USD, and the IPC had a negative performance, but when Clinton’s electoral
chances seemed improved, the opposite was true. As mentioned before, the ef-
fects over the corresponding Canadian variables were much less noticeable.
On a theoretical perspective, the differentiated response of the MXNUSD
and the CADUSD response, and of Canada’s and Mexico’s stock markets to
the campaign’s events is an interesting case that can be interpreted under the
tenants of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). This is a topic that has
not been studied before, and that opens a whole new perspective on how two
important domestic financial variables are influenced by the events taking place
in the political arena of a third country.
8On June 16th 2016 Mr. Trump accused that Mexico sends its worst people to America.
Retrieved from http://www.politico.com/news/2016-elections/623
9The USA 2015-2016 Presidential election campaign officially started in March of 2015.
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From a rudimentary stage at the beginning of the 20th century, through the
decades, the underlying knowledge-body of polls, modern statistical theory has
gained full scientific status. To the present, polls are widely used in many areas
of the social sciences with considerable success. In what concerns the USA’s
Presidential elections, polls on citizens’ intention of vote if the election took
place on a particular day are always of great interest to all groups of society. As
discussed in the third section of this work, numerous studies have attempted to
determine their importance, and test their reliability.
During the early years of the 21st century, betting markets, also known
as “prediction markets”,10 started trading “contracts whose payoff depends on
unknown future events” (Wolfers Zitzewitz, 2004). Underlying the activities
of predictive markets is the purpose to create a mechanism through which the
subjectivity and beliefs of participants are reflected on a contract’s prices and,
in that sense, become measurable. These contracts on very different types of
outcomes offer a certain payoff to those agents that make the right predictions.
In effect, the Presidential election outcome contract is one notable representative
of that universe. On Wednesday, November 19th, 2014, at 11:30am CST, the
Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) started trading a winner-takes-all contract based
on the outcome of the 2016 USA Presidential election, which this study utilizes
to infer electoral preferences.
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), postulated by Fama (1970, 1991),
gives a theoretical explanation of the drivers of public companies’ stock prices
and the currency exchange rate markets. At the same time, information on the
Presidential election campaign trends was reflected in the polls reports and the
prediction markets quotes. A relevant question that immediately arises- and this
study addresses- is whether the former’s or the latter’s signals were efficiently
incorporated in the two financial variables of interest, and in case the answer is
positive, which one preceded the other.
3. Traditional Theories on the Determination of Currency Exchange
Rates and Stock Prices of Publicly Traded Firms
The number of published studies that attempt to explain how does the de-
termination of currency exchange rates takes place is vast. There is a strong
motivation for that: firms and individuals who are exposed to exchange rates
fluctuations have a clear motivation to find ways to anticipate the future va-
lue of exchange rates. From the perspective of the treasurer of a Multinational
Corporation or an international investor, anticipated knowledge of the future
of the exchange rates would minimize their exposure, and possibly generate
extraordinary profits.
Different theoretical proposals, supported by rigorous economic arguments
have been developed for many decades. Some are very intuitive and logical, but
hardly any of them has been tested and empirically confirmed. There are three
10Also referred as “information market” or “event futures” (Wolfers Zitzewitz, 2004).
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popular and well-known conceptions that explain the exchange rates determi-
nation, based on which different variations and extensions have been developed,
although here we only refer to the original approaches.
The first one is known as the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), proposed by
the Swedish economist Gustav Cassel (Cassel, 1918). This theory suggests that
the exchange rate between the currencies of two countries should be equal to
the ratio of those countries’ price levels. The second theory is called the Interest
Rate Parity (IRP) and was proposed by John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1924).
It states that the differences between the interest rates of two countries should
be equal to the spread (differential) between the forward and spot currency
exchange rates. The third very well-known exchange rate determination theory
is the International Fisher Effect (Fisher, 1930), that says that the nominal
exchange rate between two countries should change by an amount similar to the
difference between the domestic rates of inflation of those countries, so as to
maintain a constant real rate of return in all countries.
All three theoretical approaches rely on the assumption that arbitrage op-
portunities may not exist and, for that reason, international markets are in
equilibrium. As well, all three have been repeatedly tested but, except for IRP,
very little empirical evidence supports them. So, a generally accepted conclusion
is that no single model provides an adequate explanation of most of the move-
ments in nominal and real exchange rates under a floating exchange rate regime
(Mussa, 1984), leaving open the possibility to explain the evolution of currency
exchange rates by other factors such as changes in perception and expectations
of agents. Likewise, the behavior of stock prices traded in public markets has
long been studied in the academic literature, and one of the major contributions
to better understand it is the EMH, proposed by Fama (1970, 1991). The EMH
postulates that an equilibrium price remains until new information is incorpora-
ted to the original information set. The market will interpret it and reformulate
the asset’s worth appraisal, thus, modifying the equilibrium price.
According to Dyckman and Morse (1986) “information...is reflected by se-
curity prices when prices change because of changes in demand. The process
of disseminating and analyzing information to develop new expectations about
future prices determines the degree of efficiency in the market”. The result of
the new appraisal of the asset’s worth might as well be an increase or a decrease
of its market price. The price variation will depend in direction and magnitude
on the investors’ interpretation of the information relevance and sense, in terms
of risk and future returns. Accordingly, the new equilibrium price will hold until
yet another piece of relevant information reaches the market. Elton and Gru-
ber (1991) neatly express this idea: "When someone refers to Efficient Capital
Markets, they mean that security prices fully reflect all available information."
The EMH hypothesis provides the grounds to explain why, during the U.S.
Presidential election process, the Mexican stock market behavior and the cu-
rrency exchange rate had an immediate positive reaction to the news of Clinton’s
advances in the polls, whereas the opposite effect happened when Trump’s
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position improved. The sensitivity of the Canadian variables was milder, even
when the political implications of one candidate or the other winning the Pre-
sidential election potentially represented important differences for Canada. No
doubt, this asymmetry of response poses an interesting theoretical question that
we address in the last of the paper.
4. Literature Review
Traditionally, the generally accepted measure of the subjective probability on
the outcome of political elections has been the opinion polls reported results.
However, in more recent times, prediction markets have been increasingly fo-
llowed by many interested parties as reliable sources of the market “sentiment”
regarding intention of vote11. This section briefly reviews a sample of works on
what the academic literature has reported on both.
Public opinion polls have long played an important role in the daily follow-up
and the ex-post study of political elections (Hillygus, 2011). Scientific polling,
introduced in 1936, consists on asking to a random sample of respondents who
would they vote for, if the election was held on that day. Polls do not provide
predictions, but snapshots of public opinion at given points in time; however,
there are reasons to believe that they have been an influential component in the
American elections outcomes of recent history (Graefe, 2014).
Political polls were initially published in the Literary Digest, an American
magazine founded in 1890. It was the largest and best-known nonscientific sur-
vey, which tabulated millions of returned postcard ballots that were mass mailed
to a sample drawn from telephone directories and automobile registries (Rhode
Strumpf, 2004). The weekly magazine used to conduct a straw poll regarding
the likely outcome of presidential elections. It always predicted the winner for
the 1920, 1924, 1928 and 1932 elections.
However, that was not the case for the 1936 USA presidential election. In
that year, the Literary Digest poll concluded that the Republican candidate,
Governor Alfred Landon, was the likely winner. Paradoxically, Mr. Landon only
won two states, while President Franklin D. Roosevelt won the other 46 states.
This failed prediction meant the disappearance of the Literary Digest, despite
its former successful track (Squire, 1988).
The failed prediction might have been due to the nature of the sample used
by the magazine. There might have been a sample and a response bias, since the
polled groups were mainly Digest’s readers, automobile owners, and telephone
users (Squire, 1988). Americans belonging to those groups were mostly Repu-
blicans and had an income that was slightly above the national average because
they could afford to pay a weekly magazine, have a car, and pay telephone bills
during the difficult times of the Great Depression (Gallup, 1972). Remarkably,
there was a scientific poll conducted by George Gallup during the 1932 election
period which, not only predicted the right winner, but also predicted that the
11Both, opinion polls and prediction market contracts are used in many different types of
events, from sports matches’ outcomes to social issues (abortion, drugs, etc.).
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Literary Digest results would be totally wrong. Interestingly enough, Gallup was
one of the pioneers of survey sampling techniques.
The Gallup poll represented a significant scientific enhancement of polling
techniques. Scientific polls became the mainstream and have become an integral
part of any Presidential election campaign in the USA. They are the basis for
campaign strategy by candidates, parties, and interested groups, and they are a
primary tool used by academicians and journalists to understand voting trends
and voter’s behavior (Hillygus, 2011). Since 1936 and until 2008, the Gallup poll
correctly predicted the winner of the USA Presidential elections.
However, at the time of the 2008 election, a poll analyst, Nate Silver, found
that the Gallup poll was ranked in the last spots of accuracy, compared to other
polling firms. Competition among polling firms had arrived and was to improve
the quality of results. For instance, FiveThirtyEight is a polling aggregation
website founded, precisely, by Nate Silver in 2008. The methodology used by
Silver basically consists in balancing out the polls with comparative demographic
data. Even though the results obtained by the webpage is just the reprocessing
and the analysis of polls made by others, FiveThirtyEight has rapidly become
quite popular and has won numerous awards.
What can be said about scientific polls is that their statistical foundations are
still in a process of gradual but consistent improvement and, while no polling
service (including FiveThirtyEight) can claim a flawless record, they are all
increasingly scientific and robust, and can produce reasonably good forecasts.
Prediction markets, also called “information market” or “event futures con-
tracts” allow participants to trade in contracts whose payoff depends on unk-
nown future events (Wolfers Zitzewitz, 2004). Hence, market prices move in
response to what investors believe the outcome of a particular event will be.
There are several prediction markets. For instance, the market based on the
Hollywood Stock Exchange, where participants trade movies and actors, specu-
late on when films will have their opening dates, and box office returns, among
others. A former popular webpage was TradeSports (that used to trade contracts
on different sports -American football, basketball, golf- matches outcomes), ho-
wever it does no longer exists. Nowadays, the most popular prediction markets
are the ones from Iowa Electronic Markets, where contracts on predictions of
USA elections, earnings and returns markets are traded.
The Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) was created for teaching and research
purposes by the University of Iowa in 1988, and eventually became a commer-
cial entity. In it, traders buy and sell real-money contracts based on their beliefs
about the outcome of an election or other types of events, and the price of a
contract can be interpreted as a forecast of the outcome (Iowa Electronic Mar-
kets, 2017). One of the most popular contract types traded at the IEM is the
“winner-takes-all” contract, which reveals the market expectations of the pro-
bability that certain event occurs. The contract is like a “state” price that pays
one dollar if a given event occurs, and zero dollars if it does not. Particularly,
in the case of the 2016 USA Presidential election, the winner-takes-all market
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contract was based on the popular vote received by the official Democratic and
Republican nominees.
Betting on the USA Presidential election is not a new phenomenon. A large,
active and highly public market for betting on elections has existed over much
of that country’s electoral history, as far back as the XIX Century. The center
of the betting activity in the country was located in New York. Those betting
markets were widely recognized for their remarkable ability to predict election
outcomes (Rhode Strumpf, 2004).
Betting markets had high predictive power in the four elections that took
place from 1884 to 1896. According to records of the time, market participants
perceived those electoral processes as “very close”. Also during the elections
of reference, newspapers like the New York Times reported daily quotes from
October until the Election Day. The 1916 election showed how important betting
markets were: bets in New York for that year were around the equivalent of $165
million of year 2002 dollars (Rhode Strumpf, 2004).
A contributing factor for the large size of betting markets is that, before the
mid-1930s, there were no scientific polls that could aggregate information the
way those markets did. But once both existed, there has been a debate about
which one has more predictive power. Hence, several studies have compared the
accuracy of both methods to forecast elections results.
Studies where the performance of both markets has been evaluated by com-
paring their daily market forecasts, indicate predictive markets prove to be more
accurate (Graefe, 2014). This can be explained by the fact that polls are seen
more like people’s perceptions on that particular day, while market makers are
supposed to trade according to expectations and careful analysis of the possible
outcomes odds.
Yassin Hevner (2011) tested the accuracy of prediction markets using prices
from the IEM. According to their results, prices have been more accurate than
polls more than 75% of the time since 1988. Polls had 2.1% points of average
absolute error in forecasting elections, compared to only 1.5% points in the case
of market prices.
The greater accuracy attributable to prediction markets might be explained
by the fact that trading dynamics (and the wide variety of participant agents)
in the market cancel out individual biases and errors (i.e., publicly open markets
are “efficient”) (Yassin Hevner, 2011). However, that same characteristic may
also represent a source of bias, because the traders that participate are supposed
to make informed judgments. However, information cascades can affect them;
i.e., participants might be affected by “herd behavior”, where buy or sell deci-
sions are heavily influenced by the observed actions of other market participants
(Anderson Holt, 1997). This can negatively affect prediction market forecasts
due to unexpected spikes in prices.
In addition, markets can also be affected by their traders’ characteristics.
Usually they are young, male, well-educated and earn high incomes, but that
might not be representative of likely voters, as was the case during the 1936
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USA Presidential election, where a bias on the poll participants sample was the
main cause of the wrong predictions published by the Literary Digest (Berg et
al., 2001).
Interestingly, Rothschild (2009) corrected polls and prices for inherent biases,
and his results also support the conclusion that prediction markets outperform
polls, both at the beginning of campaigns, and all along the races. Again, the
reason might be that market price setters can act on electoral factors that are
not incorporated in polls until the next poll (Erikson Wlezien, 2012).
Hence, due to the quicker reaction capacity they have compared to polls,
prediction market prices are expected to reflect Election Day fundamentals that
are not yet incorporated in the polls. This is clearly one advantage of predictive
markets, especially when there are periods of high intensity of information flows.
Notwithstanding, Erikson and Wlezien’s (2012) study, where election mar-
kets’ accuracy was assessed in years before and after the introduction of opinion
polling, concludes that prices of prediction markets add nothing to election pre-
diction beyond polls. Probably because after scientific polls began to be com-
monly used, betting markets were relegated and became heavily dependent on
what polls showed, even if the latter were not very accurate.
Graefe et al. (2014) found that using polls from PollyVote provided more
accurate forecasts in the six elections that they evaluated. They also mention
that for the elections that took place between 1992 and 2012, the PollyVote
forecast was 7% more accurate than the Iowa Electronic Markets 7-day average,
a subtlety that could represent an interesting area of research.
Using Granger causality tests, Duquette et al. (2014) conclude that during
the 2012 USA Presidential election, polls anticipated InTrade prediction mar-
ket prices. This could be interpreted as traders in prediction markets making
their investments decisions based on respondents’ intentions of vote, even if the
latter can provide inaccurate information about preferences12. These seemingly
contradictory evidences are difficult to reconcile because, even when prediction
markets work on continuous real time, and polls are taken only at discrete points
in time, polls performance evaluation also shows satisfactory results.
Besides, there is also a problem of comparison: market prices reflect con-
tinuous forecasts of the expected vote, while polls register the vote intentions
only at the time those polls were taken (Erikson Wlezien, 2012). However, when
polls are converted into forecasts based on their historical relationship with the
vote, they can sometimes beat market prices as predictors. For example, poll
projections take into account historical records of polls to make forecasts. This
can be done by regressing the candidate’s share of the vote on her polling results
during certain time period before the election date (Graefe, 2014). Using poll
projections, Berg, Nelson, and Rietz (2008) found that they were more accurate
than prediction market prices.
Another methodological approach is that of “poll averages”, which reflect
12Stout and Kline (2011) found evidence that poll respondents’ answers might not be entirely
true when there were female candidates on the ballot.
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small bits of information that might go unnoticed by most traders (Duquette et
al., 2014), hence contributing to poll’s accuracy. Graefe (2014) compared three
different poll-based forecasts: polls published on a particular day, polls’ average
on a seven-day period and poll projections, using polls conducted within 100
days prior to each of the 16 elections from 1952 to 2012, and compared them with
the IEMs’ vote-share market (a combined forecast of all market participants).
The comparison indicated that single polls predicted the correct winner 79% of
the time, combined (averaged) polls were accurate by 86%, and poll projections
were accurate 88% of the time. With a 79% accuracy record, prediction markets
were comparable only to single polls (Graefe, 2014).
However, when polls from different firms are aggregated, potential biases
introduced by individual firms’ methodologies can affect results. Volatility might
be reduced and, in that sense, combining is a useful approach to reduce forecast
error, but accuracy might not be improved (Hillygus, 2011).
Combining might also be helpful for prediction markets. When seven-day
averages of IEM contract prices were compared to their original prices in each
election from 1992 to 2012, the averages were more accurate forecasts (Graefe
et al., 2014). This result is in apparent contradiction to the EMH, which sta-
tes that asset prices reflect all relevant information and thus provide the best
prediction of future events given current information (Roll, 1984). If averages of
prediction markets proved to be more accurate than daily prices, these markets
are not truly efficient in the informational sense, at least from 1992 to 2012.
By contrast, analyzing the outcome of elections from 1868 to 1940, Rhode and
Strumpf (2004) found that there was a violation of the arbitrage-free condition
for the elections between 1912 and 1916. He concluded that, since efficient prices
of election markets should reflect the probabilities of election outcomes, there
is no possibility of making gains through arbitrage operations. Again, conflic-
ting results suggest there may be methodological issues that distort a direct
comparison of the alternatives.
Consequently, we conclude that to focus on the empirical evidence at hand,
both polls and prediction markets data can be used interchangeably as measures
of the subjective probabilities of a Republican or a Democratic winner on the
2016 USA Presidential election. While our work does not represent a contribu-
tion to the attempts to clarify which of the two is more reliable, we do find these
ex-ante predictors were highly significant in explaining the behavior of the IPC
Index and the MXN/USD during the campaign period, and not in the case of
the TSX and the CADUSD.
5. Research Design and Empirical Findings
This work hypothesizes that market participants interpreted the potential out-
comes of the U.S. 2016 Presidential Election as either headwinds or tailwinds
for the U.S.’s NAFTA partners, and that the intensity of their impact was
differentiated among the other two countries. The success of Mrs. Clinton, the
Democratic candidate representing the status quo, would have implied tailwinds
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for Mexico and Canada. The triumph of Mr. Trump, the Republican candidate,
representing a nationalistic and protectionist view of the world would, on the
contrary, imply headwinds for both countries. The expectation was that the
potentially negative effects would be stronger for Mexico, as Mr. Trump’s pro-
tectionist rhetoric reiteratively targeted that country’s exports as a threat to
employment in many regions and industries of the USA economy.
The development of the Presidential campaign represented frequent ups and
downs in the preferences of voters for both candidates. A naive observation of
their effect on the performance of the stock market and the exchange rates of
Mexico and Canada suggested a more formal analysis could be very interesting.
Two alternative sources of information were selected to capture the preferen-
ces of U.S. voters during the months leading to the USA Presidential Election
day on November 8th, 2016. Due to their dynamic nature and fast update, the
data on “bets” and “polls” on the likely outcome of the election were used to
capture the trends in voters’ preferences towards the two front-runner Presiden-
tial candidates. The bets market was data represented by the IEM prediction
market “winner-takes-all” (WTA) contracts, and the polls data corresponded
to the daily summary of polls13 collected and reported by the FiveThirtyEight
service. In addition, Mexico’s and Canada’s currency exchange rates and stock
market indices were used as dependent variables.
6. Prediction Market Data
On Wednesday, November 19, 2014, at 11:30am CST, the IEM started trading a
winner-takes-all contract on the 2016 USA Presidential election14. The payoffs
in this market were referenced to the popular vote received by the official Demo-
cratic and Republican nominees in the 2016 USA Presidential election. Payoffs
were not affected by votes received by nominees from other parties, the outco-
me of the Electoral College, or any vote taken by the House of Representatives
should such a vote be necessary.
The prediction contracts of interest to this study include the following two:
DEM16_WTA: $1 if the Democratic Party nominee receives the ma-
jority of popular votes cast for the two major parties in the 2016 USA
Presidential election, $0 otherwise
REP16_WTA: $1 if the Republican Party nominee receives the majority
of popular votes cast for the two major parties in the 2016 USA Presiden-
tial election, $0 otherwise
The two contracts are dependent on one another (as DEM16_WTA increases,
REP16_WTA decreases). Hence, to operationalize these variables, they were
13FiveThirtyEight daily collects dozens of polls and combines them to produce a “summary
poll” which may be considered as more representative of voters’ preferences, and more reliable
than any individual poll.
14Data is available with a daily frequency starting on 11/18/2014 up to 11/10/2016 from
the IEM 2016 Presidential WTA contracts database: https://tippie.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/
markets/pres16.html
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combined into a new variable. This avoids the potential multicollinearity, a pro-
blem that would increases the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)15 of the model.
Since both variables have the same units, calculating their spread is an accep-
table solution. The daily spread between the Last Price of both contract types
(DEM16_WTAt – REP16_WTAt) was labeled as DEMREP_BETt.
7. Aggregated Polls Data
The data on aggregated polls was retrieved from the FiveThirtyEight service16.
This entity collects the output from 1,106 National Polls on the 2016 USA Presi-
dential election forecasts. The polls have different frequency of publication but,
on any day, dozens of polls results are combined and reported by FiveThirt-
yEight. Based on the outcome of each poll, FiveThirtyEight estimates a share
percentage of intention of vote for each one of the candidates, which is then
adjusted for likely voters, omitted third parties, trend line and house effects.
It is important to notice that the share of voters assigned to Presidential can-
didates by each poll is also dependent on one another, just as in the case of
the contract prices of the IEM. At the same time, the theoretical minimum in
each case is also 0, hence a spread between them to include both data series in
a single variable was calculated as follows: (adjpollClintont – adjpollTrumpt).
The new variable was labeled DEMREPPOLLt.
Data from polls are not published as frequently as the IEM contracts prices,
especially those further away from the election date. However, after April 19th,
2016, once both candidates won their New York primaries, data series of polls
are much more complete. Hence, we use that as our starting date for the models
that include them. In the time-period sample between bets and polls, they have
a 70% correlation which indicates a close relationship between them.
8. Financial Markets Variables
The market variables of interest are the main equity stock market indices of
Mexico and Canada (IPC and TSX respectively), and their currency exchange
rates versus the U.S. dollar (MXNUSD and CADUSD, respectively). All series
were retrieved from Bloomberg’s database with daily frequency for the period
11/18/2014 to 11/10/2016. Data on the MXNUSD is quoted as the quantity of
Mexican pesos per U.S. dollar; the same applies for the CADUSD, quoted as the
quantity of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar. The variables were log-transformed
and their first-differences were obtained.
Figure 1 represents Mexico’s main stock index and the MXNUSD exchange
rate. Most of the time, when the IPC recorded negative returns, the Mexican
peso lost value against the US dollar. Both variables suffered negative effects
15Two common approaches to avoid the multicollinearity problem of dependent explanatory
variables are either calculating a ratio of the two, or calculating a spread between them. Since
the theoretical minimum of both variables is 0, using a ratio is not a good idea, since it could
result in a division by zero. Thus, the spread approach was selected.
16Data was retrieved with a daily frequency from 11/17/2015 until 11/08/2016 from https:
//projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-e-forecast/national-polls/
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after the first Republican debate occur in August of 2015 when Trump claimed
that “Mexican government was purposely sending immigrants (“the bad ones”)
into the United States” (Shear, 2015). These variables were also greatly affected
towards the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016. When there was an increased
expectation that the Federal Reserve would raise interest rates, which ultimately
did happen. This decision affected both Mexican and Canadian variables (see
Figure 2). From March 2016 on, the volatility of Mexican financial variables
surged, since during that time Trump remained the front-runner throughout
the Republican primaries, and was finally chosen as the Republican candidate.
However, the most dramatic negative effect for Mexican financial markets occu-
rred after the Election Day when the MXN move from $18.32 MXN per USD
to $20.57 MXN per USD, i.e., approximately 12%, in a matter of a few hours.
Figure 1. Mexico’s stock market and exchange rate vs USD
Source: Own elaboration
Figure 2. Canada’s stock market and exchange rate vs USD
Source: Own elaboration
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The sample period includes two days after the U.S. Presidential Election
(Nov 9th and 10th 2016) to capture the immediate post-election results effect
on the variables of interest. For that purpose, the DEMREP_BETt and DEM-
REP_POLLt data for those dates was represented by including a value of -1
in each, to indicate the actual result of the election: Trump being elected over
Clinton. Tables 1 and 2 below, present the descriptive statistics of the financial
variables of this study.
Table 1. Descriptive Data of IPC and MXNUSD in levels and in log-returns
Source: Own elaboration
Table 2. Descriptive Data of TSX and CADUSD in levels and in log-returns
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Source: Own elaboration
The econometric analysis of the impact of voters’ preferences during the
2016 USA Presidential campaign over the evolution of the financial markets
of Canada and Mexico is performed using a Vector Auto Regression (VAR)
approach.
As a first step in the analysis, the variables (and their returns) are tested for
stationarity, as the utilization of non-stationary variables for regression analysis
may produce spurious results. Table 3 shows Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests to determine the presence of unit roots in the financial variables of both
countries. The results of the ADF tests for the financial variables in levels (log-
prices) and their first-differences (log-returns) indicate that the four variables
are I(1) in levels, but I(0) in first differences. The polls and prediction market
variables are, by default, stationary, as their range of possible values is within
+1 and -1.
Table 3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests
Note: The probabilities are based on MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values
Table 4 shows the results of the Johansen Cointegration Tests for the Cana-
dian and Mexican financial variables, for a linear deterministic trend (i.e., with
intercept in the cointegrating vector). The cointegration tests results for the
Mexican LIPC and the LMXNUSD indicate the existence of one cointegrating
vector according to both, the Trace p-value test and the maximum eigenvalue
test. Surprisingly, no cointegrating relationship is detected for the Canadian
LTSX and the LCADUSD in neither of the two cointegration tests.
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Table 4. Johansen Cointegration Tests
Source: Own elaboration
When variables are cointegrated, the right specification is a Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM). Accordingly, to estimate the Mexican financial va-
riables response to the electoral preferences, a VECM model that incorporates
the existence of a long-term relationship (cointegration) is in order, as represen-
ted in equations [1] and [2] below. In the case of the Canadian financial variables,
for which no cointegration relationship was detected, a VAR approach is used,
as represented in equations [3] and [4].
The DEMREPit variable alternatively represents the “bets” (prediction
market contract prices) time-series, or the “polls” time-series, since both we-
re alternatively used as exogenous variables17. Contemporaneous and lagged
effects of the DEMREPit variables were tested given that their signal might
not be reflected on the market the same day they are published, especially, for
example, in the case of some polls that were published only after the market
was closed.
VECM Equations for Mexican variables:
LRIPCt = α1 ∗ (LIPCt−1 + β1 ∗ LMXNUSDt−1 + β0) +∑ni=1 θ1,i ∗ LRIPCt−i +∑n
i=1 ψ1,i ∗ LRMXNUSDt−i + C1 +DEMREPit (1)
LRMXNUSDt = α2 ∗ (LIPCt−1 + β1 ∗ LMXNUSDt−1 + β0) +∑n
i=1 θ2,i ∗ LRIPCt−i +
∑n
i=1 ψ2,i ∗ LRMXNUSDt−i + C2 +DEMREPit (2)
VAR Equations for Canadian variables:
LRTSXt =
∑n
i=1 θ1,i ∗ LRTSXt−i +
∑n




i=1 θ2,i ∗ LRTSXt−i +∑n
i=1 ψ2,i ∗ LRCADUSDt−i + C2 +DEMREPit (4)
The lag order selection criteria for both models was obtained and is reported
below. All the length of lag criteria indicate that one lag is optimal in the case
of the LRIPC and LRMXNUSD model. In the case of the LRSTX and LRCA-
DUSD the optimal lag according to the information criteria is zero. However, we
implement a one lag basic model in this case too since the values of the criteria
are very close, as shown in Table 5.
17The inclusion of both variables simultaneously was not advisable, considering the high
correlation that exists between them, in the order of 70%.
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* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
FPE: Final prediction error
AIC: Akaike information criterion
SC: Schwarz information criterion
HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
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Table 6 shows the output of the estimation of the two VECM models on the Me-
xican financial variables (equations [1] and [2]). The conclusions of both analy-
ses are the same, even though the time-period of the second VECM is shorter
due to the limited availability of polls’ data. The “bets” time-series was signifi-
cant for both LRIPC and LRMXNUSD contemporaneously (DEMREP_BETt).
The “polls” time-series was significant in both cases with a lag of one-day
(DEMREP_POLLt−1), suggesting that polls’ (FiveThirtyEight) information is
a bit slower to disseminate onto the Mexican financial variables than the betting
markets’ (IEM) information. But, except for that, both have the same sign and
are statistically significant, i.e., they have the same interpretation. A positive
spread in the expectations of the Democratic candidate winning the election
has a positive sign for the IPC equation (the stock market rallies), and has a
negative sign for the MXNUSD equation (the peso exchange rate appreciates
relative to the dollar). These effects were confirmed during the post-electoral
period effects when, after the Republican candidate’s surprise win, the IPC had
negative returns and the peso depreciated relative to the dollar. Other inter-
esting findings in Table 5 include the fact that the cointegrating equation is
significant in all cases, and that the lagged exchange rate seems to affect the
stock market but not the other way around. Both are significant and their signs
match our expectations.
Table 6. VECMs for the LRIPC and LRMXNUSD pair
Note:
DEMREPi is contemporaneous in the case of bets (i.e., DEMREP_Betst)
DEMREPi is lagged one day in the case of polls (i.e., DEMREP_Pollst−1)
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Table 7 reports a similar analysis for the Canadian financial variables. This
time no cointegrating term was found, hence the equations are modeled as un-
restricted VARs. Canada’ marginally greater international-trade diversification
and the larger size of its economy should make that country’s financial varia-
bles less sensitive to the events of the USA Presidential campaign. In effect,
our econometric results show there was no significant impact at all. None of the
four models’ results present any statistical significance for any of the electoral
preferences proxy variables and only one of the variables in the regression of
LRCADUSD against bets, the lag of the exchange rate (LRCADUSD-1), was
significant at 5%.
Table 7. VARs for the LRTSX and LRCADUSD
Source: Own elaboration
A battery of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, normality and ARCH ef-
fects are run on the residuals of the previous models to confirm their correct
specification, and to make sure that the inference extracted from both VAR and
VECM models is correct and reliable.
The serial correlation LM tests show and absence of autocorrelation in the
first ten lags, both for the Mexican markets regressions (VECM) as well as for
the Canadian market regressions (VAR), as shown in Table 8.
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Table 8. LM Serial Correlation Tests
Source: Own elaboration
Jarque-Bera tests show that the residuals are not statistically normal in th-
ree of the four cases, mainly due to a high kurtosis (the test is not rejected
for skewness), as reported in Table 9. This is a stylized fact in financial se-
ries. Only in the case of Canada’s VAR model, using Polls data as regressors,
the residuals are multivariate normal. While the non-normality of the residuals
means the estimators are consistent but not efficient, if the size of the sample is
large enough, by the Central Limit Theorem, the confidence intervals obtained
represent a good approximation to the real ones.
Table 9. Residuals Normality Tests for VAR and VECM Models
Source: Own elaboration
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Additional tests for the presence of ARCH effects find them in the VECM
and VAR models for Mexico and Canada, respectively, using the prediction
markets (bets) as the proxy for electoral preferences, as described in Table 10.
Table 10. ARCH Effects Tests for VECM and VAR Models
Source: Own elaboration
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To incorporate the presence of ARCH effects in our estimated models, we
use the VECM and VAR systems as the equation of the mean, and model their
variance using GARCH. Among the great diversity of GARCH models available,
two of the most recognized methodologies are chosen: first, the CCC (Constant
Conditional Correlation) model, originally proposed by Bollerslev (1990) and
considered the seminal idea that underlies GARCH modeling, and the DVECH
(Diagonal VECH) model, proposed by Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988).
The interpretation of the results and conclusions regarding the variables of
the prediction (bets) market in terms of the sign and significance, remain the
same using GARCH CCC as DVECH. An increase in the probability of electing
the candidate of the Republican Party (measured through bets quotations) has
a clearly negative effect both on the Mexican stock exchange (lower level) as well
as in the Mexican currency exchange rate (it depreciates vis à vis the USD). The
GARCH CCC and GARCH DVECH models estimates for both countries using
predictions markets (bets quotations) as exogenous variables are developed in
Table 11.
Table 11. Predictions Markets (Bets) GARCH CCC and DVECH Models
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Source: Own elaboration
The Wald’s Exogeneity tests that follow are only reported for the VECM
models for Mexico, since the VAR models for Canada show no significant expla-
natory power of bets or surveys on the behavior of the exchange rate and the
stock market of that country during our sample period. According to Wald’s
tests (Granger causality in the VECM), it may be concluded that the exchange
rate causes the performance of the stock market index in the Granger sense,
but not the other way around. This result applies both for the bets model and
for the surveys model, since both reject that the LRMXNUSD coefficient in the
equation of LRIPC, is zero as seen in the first part of Table 12.
320 Nueva Época REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Table 12. Granger Causality Tests
Source: Own elaboration
Finally, the impulse response graphical representation of the VECM models
(Figure 3) shows that the response of a shock on the Mexican stock market index
(LIPC) on itself vanishes away gradually, while its effect on the exchange rate
(LMXUSD) first has a negative impact but five days later it is fully absorbed
and, by day five, marginally enters into positive territory. In the case of a shock
on the exchange rate, it initially affects the stock market negatively, and very
gradually tends to disappear, after ten days. A shock on the exchange rate on
itself remains present after ten days and tends to diminish very slowly.
Figure 3. Impulse-response Graphs for the VECM
Source: Own elaboration
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9.Conclusion
This work presents original findings on the effects that the United States politics
have on Mexican and Canadian financial markets. By analyzing the impact of
public opinion polls and prediction market prices of the 2015-2016 USA presi-
dential election on Mexican and Canadian stock markets, and on these coun-
tries’ currency exchange rates, it contributes to the literature of Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH) and to the study of the recent USA Presidential elections
influence on financial markets beyond that country’s borders.
First, the EMH states that financial markets are efficient as their prices
adjust in response to any information that is relevant for the pricing of financial
assets and, in this sense, arbitrage opportunities are not possible. However,
surprisingly, our econometric results suggest that Canadian financial markets
were not statistically affected by what happened in the American political arena.
In contrast, the information on the campaign trail was incorporated in a
rapid and unbiased way on the Mexican currency and stock market. In practical
terms, this regularity was helpful for portfolio managers when establishing their
investment strategies. For instance, in order to beat the Mexican market, they
were in a position to incorporate the anticipated effect of political news into
their investment portfolios strategies, according to whether the news gave a
lead to one or the other candidates. This active approach led in many cases to
traders outperforming the market. Conversely, portfolio managers could take a
passive approach when tracking the Canadian index.
Second, this study contributes to the debate on whether polls follow bets
or vice versa. According to our econometric results using Mexican variables,
polls information takes longer to be incorporated into the financial variables of
interest, compared to prediction markets’ information. This finding fully agrees
with the reaction time advantages that Duquette et al. (2014) mentioned in
their work, but was lacking and empirical confirmation.
Third, empirical results show that country characteristics are indeed quite
relevant for financial markets when affected by macroeconomic news. NAFTA
was created with the purpose of having a free-trade zone to promote comple-
mentarities and impulse economic growth among its three members, Canada,
Mexico and the U.S. Given the very profound differences in economic develop-
ment between Mexico and the other two members, the agreement seemed quite
appropriate. However, more than twenty years later the dependence of Mexico’s
financial markets with respect to the political events in the U.S. proves is a fact
that needs further analysis and a serious consideration from the point of view of
the country’s economic development strategies. One of the stronger lessons that
derive from this study’s results is the need of doing whatever it takes to reduce
the Mexican economy’s dependence from a single commercial partner. Econo-
mists, think-tanks, academicians and government authorities should coordinate
and develop plans and strategies to achieve that end.
Lastly, this study analyzes a quite novel topic, since there are not so many
studies about the 2016 US presidential election. Empirical results reflected on
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the ups and downs of the campaign, plus its dramatic outcome, opened a new
avenue for future research. It might be interesting to study and evaluate the
impact of Trump’s policies and decisions on the other two NAFTA member
countries.
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